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A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
THE CASE OF THE RED SEA CHARTERS:
MAURICE FINKELSTEIN
T HE oft repeated rule that resort to the courts must await
exhaustion of available administrative remedies, perhaps
requires an agonizing reappraisal. We shall not here discuss
the merits of that problem. Like the earlier papers in this
series,' this is a factual study of but a single case 2 made not
only from reported decisions, but from papers, correspon-
dence and materials in the lawyers' files. Whithersoever they
lead, our views must follow.
Early in 1941, the military situation of the Allied Powers
in North Africa was in urgent need of improvement. Among
their needs were additional supplies of war material, which
could be obtained only from the "arsenal of liberty." Lend-
lease funds were available to the British for the purchase of
the needed supplies, but shipping facilities were difficult to
obtain. The United States Maritime Commission undertook
therefore the task of filling this void. Eighty-one vessels were
assembled from private owners and contracts for space char-
ters were entered into between the ship owners and the
British Ministry of War Transport. The Maritime Commis-
sion took a leading part, not only in assembling the tonnage,
but also in negotiating the rates to be paid by the British
Ministry of War Transport. The materials had to be carried
through then perilous waters to Suez via the Red Sea.
t Late Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1 Four prior case histories were published in this Review. See Finkelstein,
The Case of the Beverly Hotel-A Study of the Judicial Process, 27 ST. JOHN's
L. REv. 261 (1953); The Case of the Broker's Commission, 28 ST. JoHN's L.
REv. 220 (1954); The Case of Angelina v. Euclid: A Study in Procedural
Entanglements, 29 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav. 36 (1954); The Case of the Recalcitrant
Debtor: A Study in Creditors' Rights, 30 ST. JOHN's L. Ray. 200 (1956).
2 United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 231 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
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This venture was carried through efficiently and
smoothly. Ninety voyages were made by the eighty-one
vessels. Delays and losses were negligible. The charter hire
was paid by the Maritime Commission (out of lend-lease
funds), and in addition many of the nineteen shipping com-
panies involved were able to pick up satisfactory return
cargoes.
When the voyages to the Red Sea and back had been
completed, it developed that out of total revenues of
$31,364',880.11, the shipping companies had earned net profits
of $26,874,176.70.3 The publicity attained by these some-
what unusually high profits resulted in the inevitable con-
gressional investigation.
The investigation was held by the House Committee on
The Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Hearings before the
Committee were held on March 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 1943, and
January 27, 1944. The Committee reported that in its opin-
ion the rates paid for the Red Sea charters were too high,
"'and exceedingly so,' and completely out of line with what
had been anticipated.4
Even before the Committee's report, but after the hear-
ings were held, two of the companies which had participated
in the Red Sea charters (Weyerhauser Steamship Company
and American President Lines) had made voluntary repay-
ments of a substantial portion-of their profits to the Maritime
Commission.5
Shortly after the Committee, hearings and prior to the
Committee's report, the Price Adjustment Board of the Mari-
time Commission had instituted proceedings to renegotiate
the various charters entered into by the steamship companies
in connection with this Red Sea venture. The Waterman
Steamship Company thereupon brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin
the Price Adjustment Board of the Maritime Commission
from maintaining such proceedings.
3 H.R. REP. No. 2088, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944).
4Id. at 12.
GId. at 11.
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The Waterman Company's position was that the Price
Adjustment Board was without jurisdiction to renegotiate
the Red Sea charters since these charters were contracts with
the British Government and not with a "Department" of our
Government, as required by the Renegotiation Act.0 It was
also claimed that two time limitation periods provided for in
the act had elapsed and ousted the Board of power to com-
mence or continue renegotiation of the Red Sea charters.
The district court dismissed the complaint, briefly stat-
ing that Waterman had not exhausted its administrative rem-
edies and therefore had no standing in court.7 On appeal,
the court of appeals held this rule to be inapplicable to the
case.8 Relying on a prior decision of its own, and quoting
therefrom, it said:
Certainly the power of a federal court, in a case of actual controversy
involving no question of administrative discretion, to enter judgment
declaratory of the rights of the parties is fundamental where no ex-
clusive remedy is provided by statuteL-and likewise, even where a
remedy of some sort is afforded, if it is not an adequate substitute
and does not provide relief. And that is certainly true in this case,
for here, as the result of the District Court's disclaimer of jurisdiction,
Waterman would be subjected to an expensive inquisitorial investi-
gation. This might be followed by the sequestration of moneys due
it by the United States on other contracts; and if these are insuffi-
cient in ampunt, it might then be confronted with.an order, based on
an ex parte" determination, requiring it to repay a large sum of money,
-all in advance of a decision on the primary question, whether it iS
liable at all. To grant such a proposition would be contrary to the
principles of expeditiqus justice.9
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 10 because of, as
it said, lthe importance of the question."" Whether Water-
man was required first to test the applicability of the Re-
negotiation Act before the ddministrative agency or whether
656 STAT.'245-(1942),-50 U.S.C.'APP. § 1191 (1952).
7 Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Land,. 64 F. Supp. 904 (D.D,C.. 1944). The
brief opinion by Judge MqGuire was oi the authority of Myers v." Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
8 Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Land, 151 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cit. 1945).
9Id. at 297.
10 Land v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 326 U.S. 709 (1945)
1 Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 543 (1946).
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it was permitted to proceed directly to court for a speedy
solution to its problem was the "important question." Were
the Red Sea charters contracts with the United States, and
hence renegotiable under the act, or were they in fact con-
tracts with the British and hence not covered by the act?
The court of appeals had allowed that the court's aid could
properly be called upon to settle this problem in the first
instance.
It will be noted that the court of appeals merely re-
manded the case to the district court with instructions to
consider whether the Red Sea charters were contracts with
a "department" within the meaning of the Renegotiation Act
of 1942.12 It was to review this holding that the Supreme
Court had granted certiorari.
After full consideration, the Supreme Court reversed and
reinstated the holding of the district court.13 The Waterman
Company was thus told to exhaust its administrative rem-
edies before coming into court. The Red Sea carriers
proceeded to do just that. Ten years later (as we shall
hereinafter explain), the Supreme Court denied certiorari to
review a holding by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia that the Red Sea charters were in fact contracts
with the British and hence not subject to renegotiation under
the act.'14
In the initial stages of renegotiation, the Price Adjust-
ment Board held a series of conferences with representatives
of the carriers. An effort was made by the Board to recap-
ture part of the profits derived from the Red Sea charters.
To these efforts all the carriers but the two which had made
partial repayment, mentioned above, turned a deaf ear. For
this unyielding position they advanced four bases.
In the first place, it was urged that -a substantial part
of the profits were earned on the return voyages, by carrying
cargo for private business, not even remotely connected with
the Government. As to such profits which had been included
in the twenty-six million dollar figure supplied by. the Coin-
12 Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Land, 151 F.2d 292, 298-99 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
13 Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946).
14United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., Mi F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
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mission to the House Committee,15 there could be neither
moral nor legal pretense for any claim to recapture.
In the second place, it was urged that when the Red Sea
voyages were undertaken, they were extremely perilous.
Some vessels were actually lost. In a rapidly rising freight
rate market, the insurance money is but small comfort to the
carriers, who could not replace the vessels. There was, more-
over, ample private business to be had by the carriers and
they were loath to take on this Red Sea business for fear of
losing their vessels and thus being disabled from benefiting
from the rise in business activity after years of meagerness.
Thirdly, the carriers pointed out that the rates agreed
upon in the Red Sea charters were actually lower than the
going rate in the private carriage-by-sea trade,' and that but
for the return cargoes, the profits on the Red Sea voyages
would have been much smaller than profits available to the
charterers elsewhere.
Finally, it was pointed out that the carriers were under
no legal obligation to repay anything to the Commission, and
even if the Red Sea charters were considered a windfall,
corporate carriers would be acting far beyond their legitimate
powers, in the face of the unanimous opinions of all their
counsel that the profits were not subject to renegotiation,
should they voluntarily return money to the Commission.
The Price Adjustment Board listened, calculated, urged
settlement, but arrived nowhere. The Commission in the end
issued unilateral orders against thirteen of the carriers di-
recting them to return approximately one-half of their profits
and from all thirteen carriers the instructions to counsel
were the same-"appeal at once."
The Renegotiation Act permitted a proceeding in the
Tax Court to determine whether in fact any undue profits
were earned by any one contracting with the Government.
This proceeding was not designed as a review of the Maritime
Commission's order. It was, on the contrary, a proceeding
de novo. 17 The carriers, of course, were still confident that
15 H.R. REP. No. 2088, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1944).
16 Id. at 3-4.
-7 58 STAT. 86 (1944), as amended, 50 U.S.C. Ape. § 1191(e) (1) (1952).
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the Red Sea charters were not renegotiable, but the Supreme
Court had held that this determination must be made on the
administrative levelj -at least in the first instance, saying that:
.. . a decision as to what are and are not [re]negotiable
contracts is an essential part in determining the amount of
a contractor's excessive profits." 18
The thirteen carriers all filed petitions with the Tax
Court naming the Maritime Commission and its Chairman
as respondents. There was much conferring among lawyers
for the various carriers, and much legal research. The
lawyers treated the case much the same as do our brethren
in the medical profession when they run across an
"interesting" case in the ward. But here there was to be
no post-mortem, and so the numerous opinions will remain
forever untested and numerous problems forever unresolved.
The many petitions-with but unimportant differences-
were essentially alike. These petitions proceeded along four
avenues to attack the Commission's orders. First was the
proposition that the Red Sea charters were contracts with a
foreign power-the British Government-and hence not sub-
ject to renegotiation by the express terms of the statute. The
Renegotiation Act of 1942 19 defined the term "Department"
to mean the "War Department, the Navy Department, and
the Maritime Commission." 20 The term "Secretary" as used
in the act is said to mean in the case of the Maritime Com
mission, the Chairman thereof. 21
The statute then carefully provides that the "Secretary"
may renegotiate the terms of any contract with a "Depart-
ment." 22 Since the Red Sea charters were contracts between
American steamship companies and the British Ministry of
War Transport-an organism not included within the defini-
tion of the word "Department"-it seemed obvious that the
Renegotiation Act did not apply to these charters.
'
8 Maauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544 (1946).
19 56 STAT. 245 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1191 (a) (1) (1952).2 0 The term is now defined: "Department of the Army, the Navy Depart-
ment, the Treasury Department, the Maritime Commission, the War Shipping
Administration, Defense Plant Corporation, Metals Reserve Company, Defense
Supplies Corporation, and Rubber Reserve Company. . . ." 56 STAr. 245
(1942), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1191 (a) (1) (1952).
2156 STAT. 245 (1942), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1191 (a) (2) (1952).
2lId. § 1191(c)(l).
ST. JbHN'S LAW REVIEW
The second attack on the Commission's orders was via
the act's statute of limitations.23 The act provides that re-
negotiation proceedings are initiated by the mailing of a -reg.
istered letter by the "Secretary" to the contractor involved,
and that this proceeding lapses unless it is commenced within
one year after the close of the fiscal year in which the "con-
pletion or termination" of the contract occurred. It was
pointed out that the renegotiation proceedings were not com-
menced until November, 1943, while the Red Sea voyages
were completed in 1941 and that therefore more than one year
had elapsed after the end of the fiscal year in which com-
pletion of the contracts had occurred.
Thirdly, it was urged upon the Tax Court that final pay-
ment of amounts due on the Red Sea charters had been made
in If941 and that the statute expressly exempted from its
coverage all contracts with respect to which final payment
had been made prior to April 28, 1942.24
Lastly, and as a final and conclusive thrust, the carriers
maintained that there were no excessive profits earned from
the Red Sea charters.
Although as we have seen, this case had already been
before the Supreme Court once and was to be before that
tribunal again and again, there never was a decision by the
high court on any of the four points raised by the petitioning
carriers and the entire case was ultimately disposed of by a
denial of certiorari. But first there was to be a great deal
of legal travail and at one point considerable vexation of
spirit.
To each of the four attacks on the Commission's orders,
the government lawyers had a ready answer. They main-
tained first that the Red Sea charters were in reality con-
tracts with the Maritime Commission. The fact that the
British Ministry of War Transport was named as the char-
terer in the written agreements was deemed irrelevant, since
it was claimed that the British Ministry was acting as agent
for the United States Government. Secondly, the Govern-
ment urged that th6 statute of limitations had not yet run,
231d. § 1191(c) (3).
24 Act of Oct. 21, 1942, c. 619, 56 STAT. 984.
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since the "completion or termination" of the contracts had
not yet occurred. This was due to the fact that the carriers
had filed claims for demurrage which had not yet been
adjusted. This point was also used to destroy the third at-
tack on the Commission's orders. For if the demurrage
claims had not yet been adjusted, it was clear, said the gov-
ernment lawyers, that final payment 25 had not yet been made.
As to the last attack on the Commission's orders, that
there were in fact no excessive profits earned by the carriers
from the Red Sea charters-as to this, the Government was
never called upon to answer. The figures given by the House
Committee on Marine and Fisheries were never alluded to in
the entire course of the litigation.
The California Eastern Line was the first to be heard.
It was the owner of the S.S. Vermont, one of the vessels char-
tered to the British Ministry of War Transport for the Red
Sea venture. While the California Eastern Line was not
among the companies listed in the House Committee report,26
nevertheless, a Commission order had been made directing
the return of $164,000 by the company to the Commission.
The first step taken by counsel for California Eastern
was to ask the Tax Court to sever the issues, that is, to post-
pone the consideration of the problem of excessive profits-
an admittedly difficult investigation-until after a determina-
tion of the legal problems raised by the petition. The Tax
Court acquiesced and agreed to a first and separate trial on
the question of coverage, that is, on the question of whether
or not the Renegotiation Act was applicable to the Red Sea
charters2 7 To be presented also in this first trial were the
various provisions of the Renegotiation Act dealing with time
limitations. It was obvious that if any one of these matters
were to be decided in favor of the petitioners, it would be
necessary to vacate the order of the Commission and hence it
would be unnecessary to go into the complex problem of
excessive profits.
At the trial before the Tax Court most of the facts were
stipulated by the parties. There was, however, serious
25 Ibid.26 H.R. REP. No. 2088, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944).
27 See California Eastern Line, Inc., 17 T.C. 1325 (1952).
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acrimony about a document, Exhibit G,'8 which the Govern-
ment offered in evidence. If the statements contained therein
were true, there would be no doubt but that the Red Sea
charters were with the Maritime Commission and not with
the British.
The history of this controversial exhibit is not without
interest. In the course of its preparation for the trial of this
case, the Department of Justice asked the Department of
State to procure from the British Government an official
statement as to the relationship between the United States
Government and the British Government at the time the
charters were executed. Such a statement was procured,
signed by one F. V. Cross, Assistant Secretary of the Min-
istry of Transport. The effect of the official statement, thus
procured, was to certify that in signing the Red Sea charters.
His Majesty's Government "were agents only and that the
principal and real party in interest was the United States
Government as represented by the United States Maritime
Commission."1 29
The Tax Court declined to admit the document in evi-
dence, but added that "even upon that basis the Government
did not establish its point." The proffered statement, how-
ever, ultimately received full consideration in the court of
appeals.3 0
After the trial, nearly one year elapsed before the Tax
Court rendered its 2-1 decision upholding the contention of
the petitioner that the Red Sea charters were contracts with
a foreign power and not with a "Department," and hence not
covered by the Renegotiation Act.
3 1
Judge Turner dissented and termed the majority view
"unrealistic." To him the essential problem was not one of
"agency," but what he called "common knowledge" that lend-
lease funds expended for the prosecution of the war would
never be claimed from governments for whose benefit they
were spent. Since the Red Sea charters were executed early
28 See United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 231 F.2d 754, 758
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 California Eastern Line, Inc., 17 T.C. 1325 (1952).
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in 1941, one may be excused for wondering just how general
this "common knowledge" was."
On February 26, 1952, the Tax Court entered its formal
order that there was no renegotiable contract within Section
403 (c) (1) of the Renegotiation Act.33
The Tax Court rules permit a limited time within which
to move for "rehearing, further hearing or reconsidera-
tion." 34 But the Government instead of making the motion,
obtained from the Tax Court an extension of time within
which to file such a motion to April 2, 1952. In support of
this application for enlargement of its time to move for
"rehearing, further hearing or reconsideration," it was rep-
resented by the Government that:
The British Embassy in Washington, D.C., from public sources,
learned of this Court's opinion in this proceeding and requested the
Department of Justice to furnish copies of this opinion. This was
done. The British Embassy in Washington, D.C. has advised the
Department of Justice that it desires to submit a statement in con-
nection therewith. The British Embassy in Washington, D.C. antici-
pated that such statement would be forthcoming within the time
allowed by Rule 19(e). However, due to certain difficulties in con-
nection with the transmission of messages to London plus the necessity
of that Government to have such statement properly released by both
the Foreign Office of that Government and the Ministry of Transport
it now believes that it will be unable to receive such statement from
London within the time permitted.3 5
No such statement from the British Embassy was forth-
coining, and April 2, 1952, came and went without action by
the Government. But on April 25, 1952, "The United States
of America and the Department of Commerce as successor
to the Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission"
petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia for a review of the decision of the Tax
Court.
32 Id. at 1343.
33 See United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 231 F.2d 754 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).34 TAx COURT RULE 19(c).
35 Brief for Respondent, p. 12, United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc.,
231 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
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It was while this petition for review was pending that
the law firms representing the carriers received a staggering
blow from lawyers of the Department of Justice which sent
their research men scampering to the various law libraries
looking for a way out of what seemed at first blush a hopeless
dilemma. The instrument of confusion was a casual motion
by the Government in the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia, to remand the case to the Tax Court with in-
structions that it be dismissed. Millions of dollars hung in
the balance.
Long before any substantial research had been done, the
lawyers for the merchant marine fleet were loudly protesting
not only that the motion was without legal basis, but that
the government lawyers who had filed it were guilty of the
worst possible taste. "This is the sort of thing," said one of
them, "which is simply not done."
It appeared that,while the case was pending in the Tax
Court a reorganization of federal agencies was effected
whereby the United States Maritime Commission was abol-
ished and its functions transferred to the Secretary of Com-
merce. The Reorganization Act provided:
No suit, action, or other proceeding lawfully commenced by or against
the head of any agency or other officer of the United States, in his
official, capacity or in relation to the discharge of his official duties,
shall abate by reason of the taking effect of any reorganization plan
under the provisions of ... [the Reorganization Act], but the court
may, on motion or supplemental petition filed at any time within
twelve months after such reorganization plan takes effect, showing a
necessity for a survival of such suit, action, or other proceeding to
obtain a settlement of the questions involved, allow the same to be
maintained by or against the successor of such head or officer under
the reorganization effected by such plan or, if there be no such
successor, against such agency or officer as the President shall
designate.3 6
As no substitution had been asked for by either party
to the proceedings within the time specified, the Govern-
ment's motion in the court of appeals that the cause be re-
manded to the Tax Court with instructions that the petition
3663 STAT. 206 (1949), 5 U.S.C. § 133Z-7 (1952).
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be dismissed was filed. This was the motion that had caused
so much perturbation of spirit to the lawyers for the mer-
chant marine interests. Nor was the legal fraternity dis-
turbed without cause. Government counsel had called the
attention of the court to two recent cases which gave color
to their position, Defense Supplies Corporation v. Lawrence
Warehouse Company 37 and Updegraff v. Pace.3 8
In the Defense Supplies case,39 the courts were con-
fronted by a statute which had abolished the Defense
Supplies Corporation as of July 1, 1945. The statute also
provided that no actions by or against the corporation should
"abate," but that for proper cause shown, a court might
within twelve months of the dissolution of the Defense Sup-
plies Corporation substitute its successor, the R.F.C. as a
party plaintiff or defendant, as the case may be. No such
substitution was made within the year. But the court had
during the year entered judgment in favor of the Defense Sup-
plies Corporation. The Supreme Court of the United States
held: (1) That the judgment was valid since the action had
not abated when it was entered; (2) that no substitution
could be ordered after the twelve month period had expired,
since it was not thinkable that "Congress intended a gesture
of futility when it stated a twelve month period for substi-
tution"; 40 (3) that after the twelve month period, the action
was at an end and no appellate court could review it on the
merits.
In Updegraff v. Pace,41 a suit against the Secretary of
the Army was dismissed where the Secretary's functions had
been transferred to the Secretary of the Air Force and no
substitution had been asked for or ordered within the twelve
month period provided by the National Security Act of 1947.
Of course, the statute here involved was somewhat dif-
ferent from the statutes involved in the two cases cited above
and relied on by the Government. Yet it was clear that the
lawyers for the carriers should have asked in the Tax Court
37336 U.S. 631 (1949).
38 188 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
39 Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., 336 U.S. 631 (1949).
40Id. at 636.
4- 188 F.2d 646 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
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for a substitution of the Department of Commerce for the
Maritime Commission. At long last, the case had reached an
embarrassing impasse. The lawyers could only plead by way
of confession and avoidance. The consequences were serious
not only to the clients, but also to the lawyers, for if the bene-
fits of the judgment for the California Eastern in the Tax
Court were to be lost, no new action could be brought-as the
short ninety day period of limitations to petition the Tax
Court had long ago expired. 42
But study and reflection brought counsel, and direction
for much research was suggested by a dissenting opinion
written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The opinion was writ-
ten in Snyder v. Buck,4, a most unfortunate case. The suit
was by the widow of a member of the naval services for man-
damus to, compel the Paymaster General of the Navy to pay
to the plaintiff a death gratuity authorized by Congress.44
Judgment for the plaintiff had been rendered by the district
court on January 30, 1948. 4 5 On March 18, of the same year,
notice of appeal had been filed in the name of Buck, Pay-
master General of the Navy. Buck, however, had retired on
March 1st, and had been replaced. Six months passed with-
out either side moving for substitution, and the court of
appeals thereupon vacated the judgment and remanded the
cause to the district court with instructions to dismiss the
complaint.48 The Supreme Court affirmed, saying petitioner
lost her judgment and must start over. 47
It will be noted that both in Buck v. Snyder,48 as in
Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence,49 the judgment appealed
from was entered before the period within which substitution
of defendants might have been made had expired. Yet in
Buck v. Snyder,50 the judgment was vacated and complaint
dismissed, whereas in Defense Supplies Corp. v. Lawrence,5
42 58 STAT. 86 (1944), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1191(e)(1) (1952).
43 340 U.S. 15 (1950).
44 Act of June 4, 1920, c. 228, 41 STAT. 824.
45 Snyder v. Buck, 75 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1948).
46 Buck v. Snyder, 179 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (per curiam).
47 Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 22 (1950).
48 179 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (per curiarn).
49168 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1948).
5o 179 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (per curiam).
51 168 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1948).
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the appeal was dismissed, but the judgment allowed to stand.
According to the majority, an amendment to the statute
forced this result.52
For many years, it had been held in the federal courts
that an action to compel an official to discharge his official
duty abated when the official died or retired from office.53
The reasons for the rule will not stand the tests of logic, but
nonetheless the rule was well-established. Reacting to a sug-
gestion made by the Supreme Court, in the course of its de-
cision in Bernardin v. Butterworth5 4 Congress by the Act of
February 8, 1899, provided that no action against a federal
officer, in his official capacity should abate by reason of his
death or resignation, but that the same might be continued
by a timely request for substitution.5
In response to a second suggestion by the Supreme Court
in Irwin v. Wright66 that it would promote the ends of jus-
tice if the provisions of the Act of February 8, 1899, were
extended to suits in the federal courts by and against state
officers, Congress enacted Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of
1925. It was under this later act that Snyder v. Buck 11 was
decided. While the purpose of Section 11 was merely, as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter pointed out, to extend the coverage of
the 1899 act to state officers, the new act included the old and
made some changes in wording. These changes, according to
the majority, dictated a dismissal of the complaint in Snyder
52 The earlier statute had provided that "... no suit.., lawfully commenced
... shall abate ... but, in such event, the Court.. . at any time within twelve
months thereafter ... may allow the same to be maintained.. .. " Act of Feb.
8, 1899, c. 121, 30 STAT. 822. But the Supreme Court pointed out that:
"The rule was again changed by § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1925. The
provision that no action should abate was eliminated. It was provided that
the action might be continued against the successor on the requisite showing
within the stated period. The revision effected a substantial ahange. The 1925
Act made survival of the action dependent on a timely substitution." Snyder
v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 19 (1950).
The elimination of the words "no suit shall abate" from the amended act
destroyed the case ab ittitio.
D3 Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444 (1933) ; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Wendell,
261 U.S. 1 (1923); United States ex rel. Lewis v. Boutwell, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
604 (1873); Secretary v. McGarraman, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 298 (1870).
54 169 U.S. 600 (1898).
55 Act of Feb. 8, 1899, c. 121, 30 STAT. 822.
58258 U.S. 219 (1921).
57 340 U.S. 15 (1950).
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v. Buck.58 Mr. Justice.Frankfurter, however, was of a dif-
ferent opinion. He said:
So far as concerns the legal effect upon the pendency of an action
due to change in the occupancy of an office, a reading of the provi-
sions of the 1899 and 1925 Acts can leave not a shadow of doubt as
to their identity of purpose and procedure for its accomplishment.
The difference between the two acts is a matter of English and not
of law. In both, Congress assumed that a proceeding by or against
an officer of the United States in relation to his official conduct would
abate unless within a time certain the court authorized continuance of
the proceeding by or against the successor in office. Only the phrasing
of this rule differs. In the 1899 Act, Congress said that such an ac-
tion shall abate unless leave is given for its continuance; in the 1925
Act, Congress said that unless leave is given for the continuance of
such a suit it is at an end. To say as we said in Defense Supplies
Corp. v. Lawrence Warehouse Co., that the 1899 Act "categorically"
provided that "no action shall abate" is a mutilating reading. The
dominant thought of an enactment controls the primary import of
isolated words. To find that the 1925 Act "eliminated" this provision
has significance only if what is meant is that certain words of the
1899 Act were "eliminated" while the thought was retained. 59
But Justice Frankfurter went further'and suggested for
the first time, the real basis for the rule of the abatement of
actions against public officers. It had best be stated in his
own words.
The intrinsic and not merely formalistic answer to this question
is of course entangled with the doctrine of sovereign immunity from
suits. In scores of cases this Court has had to consider when a suit,
thouigh nominally against one holding public office, is in fact a suit
against the Government and as such barred by want of the sovereign's
consent to 'be sued. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682, App. 729. The subject, it has been recognized,
is not free from casuistry because of the natural,.even if unconscious,
pressure to escape from the 'doctrine of sovereign immunity which-
whatever its historic basis-is hardly a doctrine based upon moral
considerations. The trend of deep sentiment, reflected by legislation
and adjudication,- has looked askance at the doctrine. See Keifer &
Keifer v. R.F.C., 306 U.S. 381, 390=392. If astuteness has been
as Ibid.
59 Snyder v. Buck, 340 U.S. 15, 23 (1950) (dissenting opinion).
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exercised to deny the representative character of an official in order
to avoid his identification as the sovereign ad hoc, it runs counter to
the rational administration of justice not to find an official of the
sovereign ad hoc and the suit against him, in effect, a suit against the
sovereign when sovereign immunity is* not circumscribed thereby. 60
The result, had Justice Frankfurter's views prevailed,
would be that the rule of abatement would in practical effect
be limited to those cases in which the sovereign had not con-
sented to be sued.
This suggestion provided a point of departure for re-
reading the numerous cases on abatement of actions and a
new application of these cases to the Reorganization Act, in-
volved in the case of the Red Sea charters. A thread was
drawn through the cases which seemed to confirm Justice
Frankfurter's view. For it could be shown that not all ac-
tions against public officers abated even dehors the statutes.
Only in the case of mandamus was the rule of abatement uni-
formly applied. Other actions did not abate. From this it
was argued that saving clauses such as were contained in the
Reorganization Act were. needed only to save actions which
would otherwise have-abated. But the petition of California
Eastern to the Tax Court was not mandamus, hence-the sav-
i6g 'clause with its limited period of substitution was not
applicable to it. So it was argued.
A counter motioh by counsel for California Eastern to
dismiss the Government's petition for review for lack of
jurisdiction only served fuither to complicate the issues
before, the court.
-After the argument before the court of appeals of both
the Government's motion to remand with instructions to dis-
miss, and California Eastern's motion to dismiss the petition
for review for lack of jurisdiction, the court 'on its own mo-
tion raised-aud asked the parties to brief-a further juris-
dictional question. It appeared that the petition 'for review
in the court of appeals was captioned "Chairman of the
United States Maritime Commission, Petitioner for Review
vs. California Eastern Line, Inc., Respondent-Appellee." The
petition itself began by reciting that "The United States of
601d. at 28-29.
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America hereby respectfully petitions for review of a decision
of the Tax Court." The question upon which the court of
appeals wanted further light was whether or not the proper
parties were before it. Of course, further briefs were written
and filed.
The opinion of the court was handed down on April
16, 1953, and was concurred in by three judges-Clark,
Prettyman and Washington. 1 The erudite learning concern-
ing the differences between actions which do abate and those
which do not, were of little apparent effect on the opinion of
the court. No one, of course, can ever gauge the shove to
predisposition that the impact of a forceful argument makes
on the minds of judges. Nonetheless, it was somewhat dis-
heartening to find that instead of a definitive holding on the
law of abatement of actions against public officers, the Gov-
ernment's position was disposed of on a collateral point. It
was held that the Tax Court was an administrative body, not
a court, and that the rules of abatement did not apply to
administrative agencies. Said the court:
We turn, then, to the statute on which the Government relies.
The Reorganization Act of 1949, in the provision above-quoted rela-
tive to abatement, speaks of a "suit, action, or other proceeding."
This must mean a suit, action, or proceeding before a court, for the
second clause of the provision says "the court" may allow survival.
The statute's primary purpose was evidently to ameliorate the harsh
consequences of the common-law abatement rules usually applicable
to judicial proceedings. Any effect it has in causing termination of
a "suit, action, or other proceeding" would appear to be secondary.
Administrative proceedings, as far as we can discover, have never
been held to be subject to the common-law rules of abatement. In
principle they should not be, and a statute should not be interpreted
as making them so subject unless the legislative intent clearly so
requires. Changes in the personnel or organization of the executive
branch should not be permitted, without good purpose, to delay or
hinder the citizen in his dealings with any part of it.62
Neither then nor later was any effort made by the Gov-
ernment to have this determination by the court of appeals
reviewed in the Supreme Court.
62 Chairman of United States Maritime Comm'n v. California Eastern Line,
Inc., 204 F2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
62 Id. at 400.
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As to the motion of the California Eastern to dismiss
the petition to review for lack of jurisdiction the court said:
The California Eastern Line has filed a motion to dismiss the
Government's petition on the ground that this court lacks jurisdiction
by reason of the nature of the question presented, contending it is
not one of those which this court will review under the doctrine of
United States Electrical Motors v. Jones, supra. We defer decision
on that motion, as it deals with the substance of the petition for
review. The case will be set down for hearing on the merits after
the briefs have been filed.63
As to the problem raised by the court on its own motion,
the court held that ". .. a petition filed here in the name of
the Chairman of the Maritime Commission should be held
sufficient to warrant our review, even though the office has
been abolished and the former incumbent has become a pri-
vate citizen." 64
The case was now ripe for a decision on the merits, of
the holding by the Tax Court that the Red Sea charters were
not, under the act, renegotiable. But this was not yet to be.
The oral argument before the court took place on November
13, 1953. Again counsel for California Eastern urged
strongly that the issue before the court did not concern either
a constitutional question nor a problem of the Tax Court's
jurisdiction and that, hence, the petition for review raised
nothing which the court of appeals was authorized to review.
The Government stressed the errors in the Tax Court, par-
ticularly the exclusion of Exhibit G, and insisted that it was
the jurisdiction of the Tax Court which was being questioned
on appeal.
The opinion of the court of appeals was handed down on
January 21, 1954.5 In it, the court declined jurisdiction.
Largely, the court's conclusion was bottomed on the opinion
of the Supreme Court in the Waterman ease.66 In that case
the Supreme Court had said:
A contractor aggrieved by the Chairman's determination of excessive
profits may have them redetermined in a "de novo" proceeding before
63 Id. at 403.
64 Ibid.
65 United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 211 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir.
1954).
681d. at 637.
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the Tax Court. Section 403(e) (1) of the Act provides that the
Tax Court "shall have exclusive jurisdiction, by order, tp finally de-
termine the amount, if any, of such excessive profits .... ." Contrary
to respondent's contention that this language limits the Tax Court's
jurisdiction so as not to include the power to decide questions of
.coverage, we think the language shows that the Tax Court has such
power. For a decision as to what are and are not [re] negotiable
.contracts is an essential part in determining the amount of a con-
tractor's excessive profits.67
While probably a dictum, the court of appeals felt that
it could not "disregard it." 68 Nor was the court of appeals
impressed by the language of the Supreme Court in a case
subsequent to the Waterman case in which (referring to the
Waterman case) it was declared that, "the Waterman Cor-
poration had contracted directly with a government agency,
the Maritime Commission." 69 This latter statement was
disposed of with finality:
This sentence, says the Government, was a conclusive finding upon
the point in dispute in the Waterman case and also in the case at bar.
But we think the Supreme Court did not intend that this one sentence,
in the midst of a discussion of the Waterman case for other purposes,
should constitute a final'and conclusive finding of fact in a case which
was not then before the Court and as to which it had no record, and
particularly where the Court had held that the Tax Court must make
the initial finding of that precise fact.70
In spite of the fact that the Renegotiation Act provides
that the Tax Court "shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... to
finally determine the amount, if any, of such excessive
profits . . ." and that "such determination shall not be re-
viewed or redetermined by any court or agency," 71 the court
of appeals had on a number of occasions held that the Tax
Court could not finally determine its own jurisdiction and
that therefore "... judgments of the Tax Court in renegotia-
tion cases may be examined in this court to determine
whether jurisdictional or constitutional limits have been
67 Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544 (1946).68 United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 211 F2d 635, 638 (D.C.Cir. 1954).9Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 766 (1947).
70 United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., supa note 68.
7158 STAT. 86 (1944), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1191(e)(1) (1952).
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exceeded." 72 But what constitutes a question of "jurisdic-
tion" is not always easy to determine. Specifically in this
case the question of "coverage," that is, the question of
whether or not the Red Sea charters were subject to the act
-surely a preliminary question to that of excessive profits-
hung on the border line, at least, of "jurisdictional"
questions.
As required by the rules7 3 the Government petitioned
the court of appeals en banc for a rehearing as a preliminary
step to an application for certiorari, and on March 12, 1954,
the application was denied. The court en bang consisted of
eight judges, but Chief Judge Stephens did not participate-
no doubt in an effort (in the event not needed) to avoid an
even decision.
The path was now cleared for review by the Supreme
Court. Certiorari was granted 74 and for the second time the
Supreme Court had-the Red Sea charters before it. The only
issue raised on the petition for certiorari was the alleged
error of the court of appeals in declining to review the judg-
ment of the Tax Court, on the ground that it did not involve
a question of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court (Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting)
reversed 76 the court of appeals and held that while no court
was authorized to review a judgment of the Tax Court con-
cerning excessive profits, nevertheless, the question of cover-
age could and should be reviewed by the appellate court. The
opinion of Mr. Justice Black recites the factual background
of the case and strongly suggests that the learned Justice was
not without convictions on 'the merits. From these glimpses
of his hintergedanke the carriers derived no solace whatever.
The case was now back in the court of appeals-this time
for a decision on the merits. The oral argument took place
on May 18, 1955. On February 16, 1956, the unanimous opin-
ion of the court, per Danaher, Circuit Judge, was handed
down. 6 It unanimously upheld the Tax Court.
72 Chairman of United States Maritime Comm'n v. California Eastern Line,
Inc., 204 F.2d 398, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
73See D.C. Cms. Ruma 26; 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1952).74 United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 348 U.S. 810 (1954).
75 United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 348 U.S. 351 (1955).76 United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 231 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir
1956).
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The delay in deciding is accounted for in the opinion:
Because of the earnest insistence by the Government that the
Tax Court's findings must fall, .we have carefully examined the entire
record and the scores of exhibits included.77
After its exhaustive and also chronological review of the
record, the court concluded:
And so the record goes, overwhelming the suggestion that the
British Ministry of War Transport was the agent in any capacity for
the Government of the United States or for any of the Departments
enumerated in the statute.78
The argument made by the Government that Exhibit G,
by itself, was sufficient to show that the Red Sea charters
were signed by the British Ministry of War Transport as
agent for the United States is carefully dealt with by Judge
Danaher. He first adopts by quoting at length the reasoning
of the Tax Court in this regard, then adds:
We need not rule directly upon the admissibility of the document
or decide that it shall have "the force of proof" or that it is any more
than a statement of the contentions of the Government as a litigant.
It certainly is not offered by the British Government in its own
behalf. We regard it as immaterial in the light of the whole record,
the facts as stipulated, and the exhibits. Whether the British Gov-
ernment held the view or "understood" that we should earlier have
entered the war, or that the United States was transporting for its
own account war goods purchased by Great Britain for use by the
latter in the African campaign, or that its Ministry of War Transport
was acting as our Government's agent for the accomplishment of our
nation's objectives is beside the point. That we had a purpose is well
known. Our own Government took careful, planned and cautious
steps to carry on this transaction for the benefit "of the democracies,"
as President Roosevelt said in his April 30, 1941, letter to the Com-
mission. The whole operation was "part of the defense effort to
which this country is committed."'" For reasons deemed valid by
the Executive, means were then adopted to make certain that at the
bar of history, the United States would not appear as a belligerent,
or as committing an act of war or as offering, under American
auspices, a target to the aggressor. The measures were designed to
protect our status, and the Commission saw to it that the documents
reflected that status. That they were sufficient, as the Tax Court
concluded, we agree.' 9
77Id. at 756.
78 Id. at 757.
79 Id. at 760.
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Neither the problem of the admissibility of the British
statement, Exhibit G, nor the ultimate problem as to the
merits of this case were ever reviewed by the Supreme Court.
Though the Government secured from the Chief Justice an
extension of time to file for certiorari to May 23, 1956, it
was to no avail. The petition was denied in October, 1956.80
Now that the Supreme Court has had the case of the
Red Sea charters before it five times-three applications for
certiorari and two full arguments-we still do not definitively
know:
1. What are the limits of the rule with respect to the
abatement of actions against public officers?
2. What is the legal significance of an intergovernmental
statement procured, as was Exhibit G?
3. Were the Red Sea charters really contracts with the
British?
4. And above all, does the rule of prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies require reconsideration by
the Supreme Court to avoid repeated experiences like
the case at bar.
The carriers are, of course, content. The loss of a hoped
for $7,000,000 to the Government is possibly not too distress-
ing. We said, at the outset, that we shall not reach the
merits. But one thought about the procedure must be
uttered. Had the court of appeals reversed the Tax Court,
or had the Supreme Court granted certiorari and then re-
versed the court of appeals, the litigation would have been
back at the starting line. There had remained undecided the
question of the statutes of limitation contained in the Re-
negotiation Act. Any decision made by the Tax Court in
this regard would, under Justice Black's views, have been
reviewable in the courts. And, finally, if all went against the
carriers, there still remained the determination to be made
by the Tax Court as to amount, if any, of the excessive profits
of the carriers. But as to this, the statute is explicit, even
court-proof, that the Tax Court's determination "shall not be
reviewed or redetermined by any court or agency." 81
so United States v. California Eastern Line, Inc., 352 U.S. 848 (1956).
8158 STAT. 86 (1944), as amended, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 1191(e)(1) (1952).
